Bradley Flint v. Dow Chemical Co by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-3-2012 
Bradley Flint v. Dow Chemical Co 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"Bradley Flint v. Dow Chemical Co" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 1037. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/1037 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-1295 
_____________ 
 
BRADLEY FLINT, 
                               Appellant 
 
v. 
 
LANGER TRANSPORT CORPORATION, a corporation doing business in the State of 
New Jersey; THE DOW CHEMICAL CORPORATION, a corporation doing business in 
the State of New Jersey.; NOVA FABRICATING, INCORPORATED, a corporation 
doing business in the State of New Jersey.; ABC CORP, I-III entities whose identity are 
yet unknown.; VAN OMMEREN TANK TERMINALS GULF COAST, 
INCORPORATED; VAN OMMEREN BULK HOLDINGS; VAN OMMEREN BULK 
STORAGE, INCORPORATED; INTERNATIONAL MATEX TANK TERMINALS-
BAYONNE; INTERNATIONAL MATEX TANK TERMINALS, INCORPORATED; 
JOHN DOES I-V, individuals whose identity is yet unknown; JEFFREY M. JACKSON. 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 06-cv-03864) 
District Judge: Honorable William H. Walls 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 26, 2012 
 
Before: FUENTES, SMITH, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: May 3, 2012) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 Bradley Flint appeals from the District Court’s entry of summary judgment against 
his state-law tort claims stemming from an on-the-job accident.  We will affirm. 
I 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we recite only the facts essential to our 
disposition of the appeal. 
In July 2004, plaintiff-appellant Bradley Flint and defendant-appellee Jeffrey 
Jackson were both working as truck drivers for Langer Transport Corp. (“Langer”), a 
motor carrier in the business of transporting liquid chemicals in tanker trailers.  One of 
Langer’s clients is the Dow Chemical Company (“Dow”), which manufactures the 
chemical Versene 100 XL (“Versene”).  Dow stores Versene at a bulk liquid-storage 
facility in Bayonne, New Jersey.  The Bayonne facility is operated by defendant-appellee 
International Matex Tank Terminals (“IMTT”). 
On July 6, 2004, Langer directed Jackson to carry a load of Versene for Dow from 
the IMTT Bayonne facility to a facility in Ontario, Canada.  Although Versene is 
corrosive to aluminum, Langer directed Jackson to transport the load in an aluminum 
tanker trailer, not a stainless steel tanker trailer.  Neither Langer, nor Jackson, nor IMTT 
perceived the problem, and Jackson proceeded across the Canadian border carrying the 
Versene in the aluminum tanker trailer.  The Canadian facility determined that the 
Versene was contaminated and rejected the load.  Jackson drove to a truck stop, inspected 
the tanker trailer, and noticed some dampness and discoloration on the back rib section.  
He notified Langer of the situation. 
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At that time, Flint had just finished carrying a load in a stainless steel tanker trailer 
and was located at the same Canadian truck stop as Jackson.  Langer directed Jackson 
and Flint to cross back into the United States in their respective trucks and to transload 
the Versene from Jackson’s aluminum tanker trailer into Flint’s steel tanker trailer at a 
cleaning facility in Buffalo, New York.  Upon arrival at the Buffalo cleaning facility, 
however, Jackson and Flint were informed that the facility was not equipped to clean 
Flint’s trailer of the marine bio-chemical that it had been carrying.  Therefore, Jackson 
and Flint continued to drive toward Langer in Jersey City, New Jersey.  While they were 
on their way, a Langer dispatcher instructed them to find a place to transfer Jackson’s 
load before a bigger problem developed.  Jackson and Flint headed to a truck stop in 
Penbrook, New York.  There, they ate dinner while it rained and then attempted to 
transload the Versene. 
Flint was injured when he slipped and fell from the top of his tanker trailer during 
the transloading process.  In order to transload the Versene, the men had to attach a hose 
to the top of Flint’s trailer.  Flint climbed up a ladder to the top of his trailer, which was 
slick with rain, and Jackson began to pass the hose up to him along the side of the trailer.  
As Flint was reaching for the hose, his hand slipped out of his rubber glove and he fell to 
the ground.  Jackson drove him to the hospital.  The following day, Jackson drove Flint’s 
trailer to be washed out, and then transferred the load of Versene. 
Though Flint recovered New Jersey workers’ compensation benefits following his 
fall, he also brought this tort action against Langer, Dow, IMTT, and Jackson.  Flint’s 
claims against Dow and Langer were dismissed by stipulation.  IMTT and Jackson each 
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moved for summary judgment.  By opinion and order dated January 25, 2011, the District 
Court granted their motions.  The District Court entered summary judgment in favor of 
IMTT because no reasonable jury could find that IMTT’s alleged negligence was the 
proximate cause of Flint’s injuries.  It entered summary judgment in favor of Jackson 
because Flint’s claim was barred by the exclusivity provision of the New Jersey workers’ 
compensation statute, N.J. Stat. § 34:15-8. 
Flint timely appealed.
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II 
On appeal, Flint argues that summary judgment was improper because genuine 
issues of material fact presented jury questions with respect to (1) whether the loading of 
Versene was an inherently dangerous activity, such that IMTT can be held liable for 
Langer’s negligence; (2) whether IMTT’s alleged negligence in allowing the Versene to 
be loaded into an aluminum tanker trailer was the proximate cause of Flint’s injuries; and 
(3) whether Jackson was an “employee” of Langer within the meaning of New Jersey’s 
workers’ compensation scheme.  We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment 
de novo, applying the same standard as the district court.  Doe v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 
653 F.3d 256, 275 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).  Having reviewed the 
parties’ submissions and having considered the well-reasoned analysis of the District 
Court’s opinion in this matter, we discern no reason to disturb the District Court’s 
decision. 
                                              
1
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The District Court had 
subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441. 
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First, we agree with the District Court that the “inherently dangerous activity” 
doctrine has no application to this case.  In support of his claim against IMTT, Flint cites 
Majestic Realty Assocs., Inc. v. Toti Contracting Co., 153 A.2d 321, 326-27 (N.J. 1959), 
under which a landowner may be held liable for the negligent acts of an independent 
contractor he engages to do work if the landowner should recognize that the work is 
inherently dangerous or involves a peculiar risk of harm to others unless special 
precautions are taken.  But Flint has adduced no authority to support the extension of this 
theory of liability to the shipper-carrier context, such that IMTT could be held liable for 
Langer’s negligence. 
Second, we agree with the District Court that no reasonable trier of fact could find 
that IMTT’s alleged negligence, in allowing Versene to be loaded into an aluminum 
tanker trailer, was the proximate cause of Flint’s injuries.  Because IMTT cannot be held 
liable for Langer’s negligent acts and Flint’s own acts in climbing up on the wet trailer 
roof, those acts constitute superseding causes that break the chain of causation between 
the initial loading of the Versene and Flint’s fall.  Although a tortfeasor may be liable to a 
rescuer injured in the aid of those whom the tortfeasor’s conduct has directly imperiled, 
no reasonable trier of fact could find that Jackson was in the type of imminent peril that 
foreseeably invites rescue.  In sum, the risk that Flint would fall from the roof of his 
tanker trailer was unforeseeable to IMTT at the time that it loaded the Versene into 
Jackson’s tanker trailer.  
Finally, we agree with the District Court that Jackson may not be held liable in this 
action because he is Flint’s fellow servant within the meaning of New Jersey’s workers’ 
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compensation law.  See N.J. Stat. § 34:15-8.  Flint has already recovered workers’ 
compensation benefits as a Langer employee.  Any reasonable trier of fact would be 
bound to conclude that Jackson was also a Langer employee, since both men worked 
exclusively for Langer, were subject to Langer’s control, and performed jobs integral to 
Langer’s business. 
III 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District Court substantially for the 
reasons set forth in the District Court’s opinion. 
